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While an increasing number of emerging economies are engaged in corporate
governance changes in their banking sectors, the performance effects of such changes
are not that well understood. Corporate governance changes are defined as those
occurring due to changes in bank ownership; they include privatization and restructuring
of government owned banks, and shifting of ownership on account of mergers and
acquisitions (M&As).1 Combined, these corporate governance changes are reshaping
the structure of the banking industry in these countries. The policy makers must weigh
the performance effects of these governance changes to assess if they are best to improve
the efficiency of financial institutions. Even though many studies have focused on
corporate governance issues in the non-financial sectors, a few studies examine the
corporate governance issues in the banking sector [Wright et al., (2002), Kini et al.
(2004), Berger et al. (2005)]. Given the importance of banking industry to an economy,
corporate governance of banks is an equally important issue as in other sectors.
The principal agent model (agency theory) and public choice theory provide the
necessary theoretical underpinning to explain why these ownership forms produce
different efficiency outcomes [Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Fama and Jensen (1983),
Altunbas (2001)]. Under this approach, separation of ownership from management
control makes managers freer to enjoy discretion and act in own interest rather than
in the interest of owners and debt holders thus giving them much fewer incentives to
be efficient.2 While separation of ownership from control persists in all forms of bank
governance, albeit in varying degrees, government owned banks experience much lower
environmental pressures due to which they operate less efficiently. By contrast, the
managers of private and foreign banks are much more accountable to owners for high
performance and value maximization of banks.
Much of the empirical research in emerging economies, however, continues to rely
on the static effects of corporate governance on long-term efficiency of banks [see, for
example, Bhattacharya et al. (1997) for India, Isik and Hassan (2002) for Turkey, Jemric
and Vujcic (2002) for Croatia, Havrylchyk (2006) for Poland; Patti and Hardy (2005)
for Pakistan; Ataullah et al. (2004) for India and Pakistan]. These studies find, in
general, that foreign and domestic banks show superior performance while state-owned
banks have unfavorable effects on banking efficiency.3 Because the static models are
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1M&As related ownership change may involve shift from private to private banks, private to foreign banks,
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2 Information asymmetries are more commonly observed in the banking sector where the quality of loans
is difficult to observe and where bad and non-performing loans can be hidden for long periods [Levine (2003)].
3A survey of recent literature by Lensink et al. (2007) corroborates these results with their finding that
foreign banks in developing and transition economies post higher cost or profit efficiency than domestically
owned banks.4These studies show that when banks adjust and adapt to the new conditions their performance generally
improves over time.
5In the case of performance effects of ownership change, some earlier studies using parametric approach
have applied a two stage procedure. In the first stage, the stochastic frontier model is estimated and technical
inefficiency effects are obtained while in the second stage, technical inefficiency effects are regressed on
explanatory variables to find out its determinants. That the two stage approach is inconsistent, empirical
models, such as those by Kumbhakar et al. (1991), Reifschneider and Stevenson (1991), Battese and Coelli
(1993), and Huang and Liu (1994), all propose models for simultaneous estimation of the stochastic frontier
and technical efficiency effects.
not designed to capture the dynamic adjustments, the earlier studies may be providing
poor approximations to the resulting adjustment path.
Privatization is considered as the driving force to reduce the agency cost problems
by promoting efficiency gains to the firms, but mixed results are found on the effects
of privatization on bank performance in different countries [Beck et al. (2005), Clarke
et al. (2005), Nakane and Weintraub (2005)]. Even as some studies have addressed
dynamic adjustments to predict the effects of privatization in developing countries
[Nakane and Weintraub (2005), Beck et al. (2005)]4, only few studies have adequately
considered the static effects of corporate governance changes [Bonin et al. (2005),
Williams and Nguyen (2005)].  Moreover, the empirical research on the dynamic effects
of M&As continues to rely on US or European banking data [see among others, Vander
Vennet (1996), Akhavein et al. (1997), Rhoades (1998), Hughes et al. (1999), Amel
et al. (2004)]. Yet we still have a rather limited understanding of how M&As end up
affecting static and dynamic performance of banks in developing countries.
While the static and dynamic considerations are undoubtedly important in evaluating
the impact of corporate governance changes, it is important to account for all governance
change effects in the same model. This framework has been used by Berger et al. (2005)
to jointly investigate the static, selection and dynamic effects of foreign, domestic
private and state ownership on the performance of banks in Argentina in the 1990s.
Even though this argument has been well understood, no or very little empirical research
has been done in developing countries to assess the performance affects of all corporate
governance changes in the same model [Williams and Nguyen (2005)].
This paper distinguishes itself from previous research by focusing specifically on
the role of the static and dynamic corporate governance changes on the performance
of banks in a developing country setting. The performance of banks is measured by
Farrell’s (1957) well-established concept of technical inefficiency, sometimes epitomized
by the concept of X-inefficiency [Leibenstein (1966)].   The work of Berger et al.
(2005) most closely compares to the present application, although unlike their two-
step procedure we take the approach of simultaneous estimation of the stochastic frontier
and technical inefficiency effects.5 The particular case we consider is the performance
effects of ownership changes in Pakistan. As shown below, Pakistan’s banking industry
has undergone remarkable transformation on account of privatization and restructuring
of state-owned banks and M&As of foreign and domestic private banks since 1991.
While the analysis in this paper is restricted to only one country, the scope of financial
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countries with prevalence of government-owned, domestic private and foreign banks.
The financial reforms in Pakistan are quite representative of the structural change other
developing countries may be compelled to carry out in order to liberalize their banking
sectors to cope with the challenges of globalization. The focus of our research on
Pakistan is further motivated by the availability of a rich and detailed fifteen-year
unbalanced panel data of 46 Pakistani banks from 1991 to 2005.
To evaluate the effects of corporate governance change, we estimate cost efficiency
of each bank in our sample from the best practice frontier using panel data methods
in which inefficiency terms are a linear function of a set of governance change variables
[Battese and Coelli (1995)]. To allow for the static, selection and dynamic effects of
corporate governance change we therefore follow the suggestion of Berger et al. (2005)
and include all the relevant types of bank ownership changes in the same model.
The results of this paper indicate that the static and dynamic corporate governance
changes lead to different short-term and long-term efficiency trends, which assure that
the short-term efficiency gains (losses) do not preclude the possibility of a reversal in
the long-term trends. In particular, we find that privatization and government restructuring
of state-owned banks lead to substantial short-term efficiency losses, but their performance
generally improves over time when these banks adjust and adapt to the new competitive
environment. Similarly, efficiency gains associated with M&As overwhelm the increasing
pre-governance change X-inefficiency levels. Our results also predict that the banks
selected for corporate governance changes are expected to hold on to the X-inefficiency
gains even in the near future. The paper thus enriches the line of studies in the corporate
governance literature that could help policy makers engage in an informed decision-
making to improve the efficiency of financial institutions.
Section 2 describes financial reforms and corporate governance changes in Pakistan.
Section 3 outlines the empirical model while Section 4 describes the data and data
sources. Section 5 describes the estimation results, explains the effects of corporate
governance on X-inefficiency of banks and presents the results of the sensitivity analysis.
Concluding comments are in Section 6.
2. Financial Reforms and Corporate Governance Changes in Pakistan
Over the past 15 years Pakistan’s banking sector has undergone a remarkable
transformation. Privatization and restructuring of state-owned banks and mergers and
acquisitions of private and foreign banks have substantially changed the governance
of the banking organizations. This structural change is generally attributed to financial
liberalization, deregulation and advances in information technology.
Before 1991, the banking sector of Pakistan mainly served as a tool to implement
the government’s development strategy. To this end, all domestic commercial banks
had been nationalized in 1972, and five state-owned commercial banks had been set
up after merger of these nationalized banks. These banks were used by the government
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allowed to operate in this period, but they could not grow and extend operations due
to regulatory restrictions on the number of bank branches. This resulted in five state-
owned banks dominating the scene holding more than 90% share in banking assets in
1990; the rest of the share was held by 16 foreign banks. While the system of nationalized
banks first proved effective at fostering more equal use of bank credit across the priority
sectors, it later became clear that the banking system as operated under state control
created economic inefficiencies. For instance, higher default rates of state-owned banks
led to swelling of non-performing loans in the Pakistani context to which Patti and
Hardy (2005) and Ataullah et al. (2004) continue to draw our attention.
This realization of economic inefficiencies under state regulation and controls
motivated reforms introduced by Pakistan’s government through its central bank, i.e.,
the State Bank of Pakistan. Through the 1990s and 2000s, the State Bank of Pakistan
has embarked on ambitious financial sector reforms characterized by liberalization,
prudential regulations and institutional strengthening of the banking industry. The
primary justification underlying these reforms has been the potential to reduce any
systematic sources of inefficiency in the banking sector. These regulatory reforms have
resulted in corporate governance changes, which can be studied at three distinct levels.
 
Firstly, as part of liberalization and reforms, ten new private banks were granted
permission to operate in August 1991, of which eight banks started operations in the
later-half of 1992; the other two banks started operations in 1993. Similarly, three new
foreign banks were granted permission in 1992 and two provincial government banks
were scheduled in September 1994. In 1995 controls on opening of new bank branches
by private and foreign banks were also removed. The privatization of state-owned
banks started in 1991 with the sale of 26% shares of MCB to the private sector; 50%
shares of MCB were divested to general public in 1992 and 1993, respectively, and
finally, the remaining 24% shares were sold in 2001-02. Similarly, 26% shares and
control of ABL was handed-over to its management under the employee stock ownership.
In 2002, a large state-owned bank, UBL, was privatized to a consortium consisting of
Abu Dhabi Group and Bestway Group. More recently, HBL, which was one of the
largest commercial banks in Pakistan, was also privatized. Mass privatization of state-
owned banks led to a gradual decline in the share of state-owned banks in banking
assets from 74.5% in 1991 to only 20.4% in 2005. This is illustrated in Figure 1, which
also shows that the share of private banks has increased from 15% in 1991 to 70% in
2005 while the share of foreign banks has fell after 2002 before reaching at its peak
level in 1997.
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6How state-owned firms in developing countries are used to finance politically motivated projects, engage
too many employees and open too many offices support the public choice theory of the government and
has been succinctly described by Jones (1985) and Li and Xu (2004).Secondly, state-owned banks have passed through phases of restructuring and
downsizing. Funded by a $300 million loan from the World Bank, state-owned banks
were subjected to restructuring and downsizing in 1997, apparently to cut financial
intermediation cost and to enhance rate of return on deposits. Under this initiative five
state-owned banks namely HBL, UBL, NBP, MCB and ABL, launched their respective
employee separation schemes and eventually 21,996 bank employees were released
under voluntary golden shake-hand schemes from these banks between July 1997 and
December 1999. To further rationalize the cost structure of these banks some 814 loss
making branches of these state-owned banks were closed down between 1997 and
2000. Another 1,122 branches of these banks closed down their banking operations
between 2001 and 2003. Some state-owned banks also suffered
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from severe liquidity problems due to over spending, directed lending and political
influence that led to fragility and vulnerability of these banks. For instance, UBL
continuously demonstrated a shortfall in its liquidity position, which was well below
the statutory requirements. Moreover, there was an alarming increase in the bank’s
administrative expenditures due to over-staffing, managerial inefficiency and waste.
Similarly, HBL starved for additional liquidity in 1999; this much needed support was
provided by the government in the form of major injections to improve their balance
sheets while attempting to maintain their financial sustainability.
Finally, since 2000, the governance of banks in Pakistan has also been influenced
 by merger and acquisitions leading to consolidation of some private and foreign banks.
Policy changes by SBP have also encouraged merger and acquisition of small and
struggling private and foreign banks by their financially superior counterparts. As a
result, a total of 12 M&As have occurred between 2000 and 2005, out of which 9
acquisitions were such where foreign banks were merged or acquired mostly by domestic
private banks.Largely for the reasons mentioned above, the governance structure of the Pakistani
banking industry has dramatically changed over the last 15 or so years. As indicated
in Table 1, the number of private banks has increased from 13 in 1993, 16 in 1997, 14
in 2000, 18 in 2003 to 20 in 2005; the corresponding number of foreign banks has been
17, 18, 19, 14 and 11; and the number of state-owned banks has been 7, 6, 6, 5 and 4.
 This decrease in the number of state-owned banks has been associated with large
expansion in the share of private and foreign banks’ branch network rising from 4.6%
in 1993 to over 73% in 2005.
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7All the banks in our data are not observed for all T time periods in this model.
By contrast, the share of state-owned banks in total branch network has fallen from
95% in 1993 to only 27% in 2005. While this relative decline in importance of state-
owned banks has undoubtedly reduced their share in assets and deposits, it probably
has also increased healthy competition between the banks to provide better financial
services to customers with significantly improved infrastructure.
3. The Econometric Model
We use the cost representation of the stochastic frontier model developed by Battese
and Coelli (1995) for the unbalanced panel data that allows time-varying bank effects.
The model may be written as
(1)
where subscript i indexes a sample bank (i =1,....,N), and  t indexes time period
(t =1,....,T)7 ; Cit is the observed total cost of production for the ith sample bank in the
ith time period; yit is a vector of bank outputs; wit is a vector of input prices of known
functions of cost and other explanatory variables linked with the ith bank at the tth time
period;  is the assumed functional form, i.e., the translog; and   is a vector
Table 1. A comparison of bank numbers and branches
All Banks State-owned Private Foreign
Year Banks Branches Banks Branches Banks Branches Banks Branches
1991 21 0
1993 36 7397 7 7058 13 284 17 55
1997 40 7828 6 5241 16 2510 18 77
2000 39 7367 6 4864 14 2425 19 78
2003 37 4946 5 1491 18 3390 14 65
2004 36 5600 4 1528 20 3975 12 77
2005 35 5867 4 1575 20 4,189 11 103
Source: State Bank of Pakistan, Various ReportsAbid A. Burki and Shabbir Ahmad / CMER Working Paper No. 07-59
7Abid A. Burki and Shabbir Ahmad / CMER Working Paper No. 07-59
8
m,nAbid A. Burki and Shabbir Ahmad / CMER Working Paper No. 07-59
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8See for instance, Berger and Mester (1997), Mukherjee et al. (2001), Isik and Hassan (2002), Patti and
Hardy (2005), and Havrylchyk (2006) among others.Cost function:
Total cost  Wage bill including directors fee + depreciation on and repair to
bank’s property + operating cost + interest paid on deposits and
borrowing + operating cost
Investments  The amount of investment made by the bank consisting of
government securities, treasury bills, shares fully paid-up, debentures,
bonds and other investments, like NIT and gold.
Loans & advances  The value of loans and advances, which include loans, cash credits,
overdrafts and bills discounted and purchased.
Price of labor  Total expenditure on employees’ salary including directors’ fees
divided by the total number of employees.
Price of financial capital  Total interest paid on deposits and borrowing divided by total
deposits
Price of operating cost  Total operating cost divided by total assets




Private bank with no-  Dummy equals 1 for all periods for a private bank if it underwent
governance change no governance change over the 1991–2005 interval and equals 0
for all periods otherwise.
Foreign bank with no- Dummy equals 1 for all periods for a foreign owned bank if it
governance change underwent no governance change over the 1991–2005 interval and
equals 0 for all periods otherwise
State-owned banks with no- Dummy equals 1 for all periods for a state-owned bank if it underwent
governance change no governance change over the 1991–2005 interval and equals 0
for all periods otherwise.
Banks chosen for governance change:
Chosen for privatization Dummy equals 1 for all periods for a bank that was selected for
privatization over the 1991–2005 interval and equals 0 for all
periods otherwise. (Note: If a bank was privatized after restructuring,
it is set to equal 1 because privatization is considered a dominant
event)
Chosen for restructuring  Dummy equals 1 for all periods for a bank that was selected for
government restructuring (e.g., downsizing, capital/equity injection,
etc.) over the 1991 – 2005 interval and equals 0 for all periods
otherwise. (Note: If a bank was privatized after restructuring, it
is set to equal 0 because privatization is considered a dominant
event)
Chosen for M & A  Dummy equals 1 for all periods for a bank that was selected for
domestic or foreign acquisition or merger over the 1991–2005
interval and equals 0 for all periods otherwise.
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Table 2. Definition and descriptive statistics of the variables
Variable name DefinitionAbid A. Burki and Shabbir Ahmad / CMER Working Paper No. 07-59
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Variables measuring SR effects of governance change:
Experienced privatization  Dummy equals 1 for all periods following privatization of a bank
starting in the next year after privatization, equals 0 for the year
of the privatization and prior to the privatization. Banks that did
not undergo privatization are set to equal 0 for all periods.
Experienced restructuring  Dummy equals 1 for all periods following restructuring of a bank
starting in the next year after restructuring, equals 0 for the year
of restructuring and prior to the restructuring. Banks that did not
undergo restructuring are set to equal 0 for all periods.
Experienced M & A  Dummy equals 1 for all periods following merger or acquisition of
a bank starting in the next year after M&A, equals 0 for the year
of M & A and prior to M & A. Banks that did not undergo M&A are
set to equal 0 for all periods.
Dynamic Governance Variables measuring LR effects of governance change:
Years after privatization  Number of years since privatization of the bank took place. Set to
equal 0 for the year of and the years prior to privation and starts
with 1 for the fist year after privation, 2 for the second year and
so on. Banks that did not undergo privatization are set to equal 0
for all periods.
Years after restructuring  Number of years since restructuring of the bank took place. Set
to equal 0 for the year of and the years prior to restructuring, and
starts with 1 for the fist year after restructuring, 2 for the second
year and so on. Banks that did not undergo restructuring are set
to equal 0 for all periods.
Years after M&A  Number of years since M&A of the bank took place. Set to equal
0 for the year of and the years prior to M&A, and starts with 1 for
the first year after M&A, 2 for the second year and so on. Banks
that did not undergo M&A are set to equal 0 for all periods.
Other control variables:
Log lagged assets Natural log of bank assets after taking one year lag for each bank
in constant 1999-00 Pak rupees
Time trend  A simple time trend variable indicating the year of observation
involvedAbid A. Burki and Shabbir Ahmad / CMER Working Paper No. 07-59
12
Table 3. Summary statistics of the variables employed in the cost function and inefficiency modelAbid A. Burki and Shabbir Ahmad / CMER Working Paper No. 07-59
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Table 4. Model specification testsAbid A. Burki and Shabbir Ahmad / CMER Working Paper No. 07-59
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11Estimates by Patti and Hardy (2005) also show improvement in cost efficiency of Pakistani banks during
the reform period.
12For further explanation on this point, see also Berger et al. (2005).
13A recent report by the State Bank of Pakistan also attributes state-owned banks’ weak performance to
“political intervention, over-staffing, over-branching” and other inefficiencies leading “to the problems
of large non-performing loans, high administrative expenses, huge losses and eroding capital base” [SBP
(2003)].
14Williams and Nguyan (2005) conduct a similar analysis for five East Asian countries (e.g., Indonesia,
Malaysia, Philline, Korea and Thailand) and find that foreign banks are more profit efficient than domestic
state-owned banks.Abid A. Burki and Shabbir Ahmad / CMER Working Paper No. 07-59
18
15Boubakri et al. (2005) also support the conclusion that on average banks chosen for privatization in
developing countries post lower economic efficiency.
16Patti and Hardy (2005) show that the banks selected for privatization in Pakistan depicted the lowest cost
and profit efficiency prior to privatization, but their sample includes only two banks that were privatized
in 1991–1992.
17In some East Asian countries, banks selected for privatization were also better performing banks [Williams
and Nugyen (2005)]. However Clarke and Cull (1999) have argued that the cost of restructuring of state-
owned banks exceeds net cost of privatization. Their findings suggest that privatization improves performance
and raises competition even in the presence of a weak regulatory framework.
18While Williams and Nguyen (2005) also do not find any short term efficiency gain in privatized banks
in East Asian countries, they do corroborate the results that efficiency gain in such banks is time taking.
By contrast, Otchere (2005) and Clarke et al. (2005) find negligible efficiency gains after divestiture of
state-owned banks.Abid A. Burki and Shabbir Ahmad / CMER Working Paper No. 07-59
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19Pakistan’s nuclear detonation in May 1998 was followed by international economic sanctions forcing the
government to freeze the foreign currency accounts in all Pakistani banks.Abid A. Burki and Shabbir Ahmad / CMER Working Paper No. 07-59
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20See Amel et al. (2004) for a review of the international evidence on mergers and acquisitions.inefficiency effects are simultaneous estimated for an unbalanced panel data of Pakistani
banks from 1991 to 2005. Our tests reveal that the traditional average cost representation
of the banking technology is not adequate on our data because most of the cost variability
is explained by the differences in technical inefficiency. That the costs of production
exceed the minimum level frontier is also indicated by the mean cost inefficiency of
36%. From 1991 through 2005, on average, the X-inefficiency of banks has decreased
at the rate of 5.7 per annum in this sample, which assures, in general, that these banks
have moved closer to their efficient cost frontier. The perceived wisdom that private
and foreign banks show superior performance than state-owned banks is also supported
by the results of this paper.
Our findings indicate that the market dynamics play a key role in determining the
direction and magnitude of the relative performance of banks due to governance change.
As one would have expected, the performance effects due to corporate governance
changes do  not happen uniformly in this sample. That is, the static and dynamic
corporate governance changes lead to different short-term and long-term efficiency
trends. In other words, the short-term efficiency gains (losses) do not preclude the
possibility of a reversal in the observed trend in the long-term.
In particular, the paper finds that privatization and government restructuring of
state-owned banks lead to substantial short-term efficiency losses for the selected banks,
but we observe a dramatic reversal in this trend in the long-term with large efficiency
gains for these banks. A continuation of this trend, if ever meaningful, should mean
that, ceteris paribus, more efficiency gains are likely to accrue to these banks in the
near future.
We have also investigated whether M&A in a developing country setting might
allow performance gains to the banks that are subject to this form of corporate governance
change. We find that following M&A, the efficiency gains of the selected banks
overwhelm the increasing pre-governance change inefficiency levels of these banks.
Moreover, the results predict that the banks subjected to M&A are expected to hold
on to the improvements in their X-inefficiency levels for a long time.
Finally, although disagreeing with Berger et al. (2005) on various points, the paper
shares their premise that all the relevant governance change variables must be included
in the same empirical model because the extent of this bias is nontrivial to be ignored
in this literature. The paper thus enriches the line of studies in the corporate governance
literature that could help policy makers in developing countries engage in an informed
decision-making concerning whether these governance changes are best to improve
the efficiency of financial institutions. Empirically, it would be useful to know more
about how corporate governance changes affect performance of banks. This may be a
line of enquiry for the future research.
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In this paper we explore the role of the static, selection and dynamic corporate
governance changes on performance of commercial banks. We use stochastic cost
frontier and panel data methods for an unbalanced panel data of Pakistani banks
from 1991 to 2005. We find overall bank cost inefficiency of 36%, which has
decreased at the rate of 5.7% per annum. Our results indicate that the static and
dynamic corporate governance changes lead to different short-term and long-term
efficiency trends, which assure that the short-term efficiency gains (losses) do not
preclude the possibility of a reversal in the long-term trends. Our results show that
privatization and government restructuring of state-owned banks lead to substantial
short-term efficiency losses, but their performance generally improves over time
when these banks adjust and adapt to the new competitive environment. Similarly,
efficiency gains associated with M&As overwhelm the increasing pre-governance
change X-inefficiency levels. Our results also predict that the banks selected for
corporate governance changes are expected to hold on to the X-inefficiency gains
even in the near future. The paper thus enriches the line of studies in the corporate
governance literature that could help policy makers engage in an informed decision-
making to improve the efficiency of financial institutions.